Abstract. Traditional cognitive science ties the concept of mind to the computational approach: mental processes are computational processes; the brain, like a computer, is the center of cognition. In contrast, embodied cognition variously rejects or reformulates the computational commitments of cognitive science, emphasizing the importance of the physical body in cognitive abilities. Unifying to researchers of embodied cognition is the idea that the body, or the body‘s interactions with the environment, constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its study. The brain is not just a computer, and it is not an independent center of cognition. These theoretical and empirical developments portend implications for the study and treatment of schizophrenia. Some of the most difficult philosophical questions arising within embodied cognition such as those concerning the representation, explanation, and the very meaning of what is “mind”, are of the kind that any theory of mind must address. Whatever the future of embodied cognition, careful study of its goals, methods, conceptual foundations, and motivations will undoubtedly enrich the philosophy of psychology.

Key words: embodied cognition, dualism, phenomenology, social cognition

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